Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is off ered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
Intuitions in philosophy
One thing that distinguishes philosophical methodology from the methodology of the sciences is its extensive and avowed reliance on intuition. Especially when philosophers are engaged in philosophical "analysis", they often get preoccupied with intuitions. To decide what is knowledge, reference, identity, or causation (or what is the concept of knowledge, reference, identity, or causation), philosophers routinely consider actual and hypothetical examples and ask whether these examples provide instances of the target category or concept. People's mental responses to these examples are often called "intuitions", and these intuitions are treated as evidence for the correct answer. At a minimum, they are evidence for the examples' being instances or non-instances of knowledge, reference, causation, etc. Th us, intuitions play a particularly critical role in a certain sector of philosophical activity.
Th e evidential weight accorded to intuition is often very high, in both philosophical practice and philosophical refl ection. Many philosophical discoveries, or putative discoveries, are predicated on the occurrence of certain widespread intuitions. It was a landmark discovery in analytic epistemology when Edmund Gettier (1963) showed that knowledge isn't equivalent to justifi ed true belief. How did this "discovery" take place? It wasn't the mere publication of Gettier's two examples, or what he said about them. It was the fact that almost everybody who read Gettier's examples shared the intuition that these were not instances of knowing. Had their intuitions been diff erent, there would have been no discovery. Appeals to intuition are not confi ned to epistemology; analytic philosophy as a whole is replete with such appeals. Saul Kripke remarks: "Of course, some philosophers think that something's having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don't know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have for anything, ultimately speaking" (1980: 42) .
As a historical matter, philosophers haven't always described their methodology in the language of intuition. In fact, this seems to be a fairly recent bit of usage. Jaakko Hintikka (1999) traces the philosophical use of "intuition" to Chomsky's description of linguistics' methodology. In the history of philosophy, and even in the early years of analytic philosophy, the terminology of intuition is not to be found. Of course, historical philosophers dealt extensively with intuition in other contexts, but not in the context of appealing to particular examples and their classifi cation. Th is is not to say that historical philosophers and earlier 20 th -century philosophers did not make similar philosophical moves. Th ey did make such moves, they just didn't use the term "intuition" to describe them. Consider Locke's presentation of the famous prince-cobbler case in his discussion of personal identity:
For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees he would be the same person with the prince … (Locke 1694 (Locke /1975 emphasis added) Locke says that every one "sees" that a certain classifi cation -being the same as -is appropriate, and his term "sees" is readily translatable, in current terminology, as "intuits". Among ordinary-language philosophers of the mid-20 th century, roughly the same idea was expressed in terms of what people would or wouldn't be inclined to say. One "would say" that the cobbler was the same person as the prince; one "wouldn't say" that a Gettier protagonist had knowledge. Here the propriety of saying or not saying something took the place of having an intuition; the matter was described in terms of speech inclinations rather than mental episodes. Nonetheless, the epistemological status of these inclinations or episodes played the same role in philosophical methodology. Each was invoked as a crucial bit of evidence for the philosophical "facts" in question.
Skepticism about intuitions
Nowadays philosophers routinely rely on intuitions to support or refute philosophical analyses, but a number of skeptics have emerged who raise challenges to this use of intuition. Th e skeptics include Robert Cummins (1998) , Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2001) , and Michael Devitt (1994) . Th ey dispute the evidential credentials or probity of intuitions. Th ey deny that intuitions confer the kind of evidential support that they are widely taken to confer.
Th e grounds for skepticism are somewhat variable, but mostly they concern the fallibility or unreliability of intuitions, either intuitions in general or philosophical intuitions in particular. Here are three specifi c criticisms.
(1) Garden-variety intuitions are highly fallible. Why should philosophical intuitions be any diff erent? If the latter are highly fallible, however, they shouldn't be trusted as evidence.
Garden-variety intuitions include premonitions about future events, intuitions about a person's character (based on his appearance, or a brief snatch of conversation), and intuitions about probabilistic relationships. Th ese are all quite prone to error. What reason is there to think that philosophical intuitions are more reliable?
(2) People often have confl icting intuitions about philosophical cases. One person intuits that case x is an instance of property (or concept) F while another person intuits that case x isn't an instance of property (or concept) F. When such confl icts occur, one of the intuitions must be wrong. If the confl icts are frequent, the percentage of erroneous intuitions must be substantial and the percentage of correct intuitions not so high. Th us, the modest level of reliability of philosophical intuitions doesn't warrant assigning them signifi cant evidential weight.
A third ground for skepticism doesn't appeal directly to the unreliability of intuition but rather to our inability to (independently) know or determine its reliability.
(3) Th e outputs of an instrument, procedure, or method constitute data we can properly treat as evidence only when that instrument, procedure, or method has been calibrated (Cummins 1998 ). Calibration requires corroboration by an independent procedure. Has intuition been calibrated? Has it been shown to be reliable by a method independent of intuition itself? Th ere is no way to do this. Suppose we have a philosophical interest in fairness, and we ask people for their intuitions about the fairness of distributions described in certain hypothetical cases. We shouldn't trust their intuitions about these cases unless we have antecedently determined that their fairness intuitor is reliable, i.e., unless it has been calibrated. But how can we perform this calibration? We don't have a "key" by which to determine which outputs of their intuitor are correct, and there is no key to be found.
Initial responses to skeptical challenges
For each of these skeptical challenges, there appear to be at least initially plausible responses. In response to challenge (1), a defender of philosophical intuition would want to distinguish between diff erent types of intuitions. First, the intuitions we have here identifi ed are what might be called classifi cation or application intuitions, because they are intuitions about how cases are to be classifi ed, or whether various categories or concepts apply to selected cases. 1 Th is in itself, however, provides no reason for thinking that philosophical intuitions are epistemically superior to garden-variety intuitions. Why should classifi cation or application intuitions be superior? A supplementary response is that application intuitions are a species of rational intuitions, and that rational intuitions are more reliable than others. Many authors are sympathetic to this approach, but George Bealer (1998) has been most forceful in championing it. Bealer distinguishes between physical and rational intuitions, and regards only the latter as having special epistemic worth. We shall return to this below.
In response to challenge (2), a defender of philosophical intuitions might urge caution. It remains to be seen just how extensive are the confl icts in application intuitions across diff erent individuals. Moreover, whether the confl icts are genuine depends on the precise contents of the intuitions, or what they are taken to be evidence for. It is possible that a state of aff airs for which one person's intuition is evidence doesn't really confl ict with a state of aff airs for which another person's intuition is evidence, even when there is a "surface" confl ict. I'll return to this point below as well.
In response to challenge (3), a defender of philosophical intuitions might reject Cummins's epistemological presuppositions. Th e defender might say that independent corroboration, or calibration, of an instrument, procedure, or method is too stringent a requirement on its evidence-conferring power. In particular, there must be some procedures or methods that are basic. In other terminology, there must be some basic "sources" of evidence. Basic sources are likely to include mental faculties such as perception, memory, introspection, deductive reasoning, and inductive reasoning. Th ese faculties are all regarded, by many or most epistemologists, as bona fi de sources of evidence. Yet all or many of these sources may be basic in precisely the sense that we have no independent faculty or method by which to establish their reliability. Yet that doesn't undercut their evidence-conferring power. Consider memory, for example. Memory may be our basic way of forming true beliefs about the past. All other ways of gaining access to the past depend on memory, so they cannot provide independent ways of establishing memory's reliability (see Alston 1993 ). If we accept Cummins's constraint on evidencehood, the outputs of memory will not constitute legitimate data or pieces of evidence. But that is unacceptable, on pain of general skepticism. It is better to accept the conclusion that basic sources of evidence don't have to satisfy the calibration, or independent corroboration, constraint. Intuition may be among the basic sources of evidence. Although Cummins's independent corroboration condition on a source of evidence is too stringent, it seems reasonable to substitute a weaker condition as a further requirement on evidencehood. Th is weaker condition is a "negative" one, viz., that we not be justifi ed in believing that the putative source is unreliable. A possible variant is the condition that we not be justifi ed in strongly doubting that the source is reliable. Th e latter negative condition will sometimes be invoked in the discussion to follow.
Th e targets of philosophical analysis
In response to skeptical challenge (2), I said that resolution of this challenge requires a more careful inquiry into the precise targets of philosophical analysis. Philosophical analysis, of course, doesn't simply aim to answer questions about particular cases. Epistemology isn't much interested in whether this or that example is an instance of knowledge; rather, it aims to say what knowledge is in general, or something in that ballpark. Individual cases are typically introduced as test cases of one or more general accounts. Depending on how a case is classifi ed, it might falsify a general account or corroborate it. But what, exactly, does philosophical analysis aim to give general accounts of? Knowledge, causation, personal identity, and so forth are typical examples of categories that absorb philosophy, but diff erent theorists have diff erent conceptions (often unstated) of how, exactly, these targets are to be construed. A choice among these diff erent construals can make a big diff erence to the viability of intuition as a source of evidence about the targets, because many construals invite strong doubts that the source is reliable. Let us examine fi ve ways of construing the targets.
(1) Platonic forms (2) Natural kinds (3) Concepts 1 -concepts in the Fregean sense (4) Concepts 2 -concepts in the psychological sense, specifi cally, the individualized, personal sense (5) Concepts 3 -shared concepts 2 Th e fi rst two construals invoke entities that aren't described as concepts. Each is some sort of non-conceptual entity that exists entirely "outside the mind". According to the fi rst construal, philosophy aims to obtain insight into (e.g.) the form of the Good, and other such eternal, non-spatiallylocated entities. According to the second construal, knowledge, causation, personal identity, and so forth are "natural" properties or relations, which exist and have their distinctive characteristics quite independently of anybody's concepts or conception of them, like water or electricity.
Th ere are two questions to be posed for each of these (and similar) construals. First, under this construal how could it plausibly turn out that intuitions are good evidence for the "constitution" or characteristics of the targets? Second, does this construal comport with the actual intuitional methodology used by analytic philosophers? Start with construal (1). If the target of philosophical analysis is the constitution or composition of Platonic forms (or their ilk), the question is why an episode that occurs in somebody's mind -an episode of having an intuition -should count as evidence about the composition of a Platonic form.
2 If someone experiences an intuition that the protagonist in a selected Gettier example doesn't know the designated proposition, why should this intuitional experience be evidence that the form KNOWLEDGE is such that the imaginary protagonist's belief in this proposition doesn't "participate" in that form? What connection is there between the intuition episode and the properties of the form KNOWLEDGE such that the intuition episode is a reliable indicator of the properties of KNOWLEDGE? (I am assuming, for argument's sake, that this form exists.) We have reason to seriously doubt the existence of a reliable indicatorship relation.
Notice that it doesn't much matter how, exactly, we characterize intuitions. Whether intuitions are inclinations to believe, or a sui generis kind of seeming or propositional attitude (see Bealer 1998: 207) , it is still a puzzle why the occurrence of such a mental event should provide evidence for the composition of a Platonic form. Compare this case with perceptual seemings and memory seemings. In these cases we know (in outline, if not in detail) the causal pathways by which the properties of an external stimulus can infl uence the properties of a visual or auditory experience. With this kind of dependency in place, it is highly plausible that variations in the experience refl ect variations in the stimulus. So the specifi cs of the experience can plausibly be counted as evidence about the properties of the stimulus. Similarly in the case of memory, what is presently recalled varies (counterfactually) with what occurred earlier, so the specifi cs of the recall event can be a reliable indicator of the properties of the original occurrence. But is there a causal pathway or counterfactual dependence between Platonic forms and any mental "registration" of them? A causal pathway seems to be excluded, because Platonic forms are not spatio-temporal entities. A counterfactual dependence is not impossible, but there is reason to doubt that such a dependence obtains. I here register the general sorts of qualms that have long plagued traditional accounts of rational insight or "apprehension" of abstract entities. Th ese accounts leave too many mysteries, mysteries that undercut any putative reliability needed to support a refl ective acceptance of an evidential relation-ship between intuitional episodes and their targets construed as abstract entities.
Let us turn now to construal (2), the natural kinds construal, which has been formulated and championed by Hilary Kornblith (2002) . Kornblith emphasizes that natural kinds are "in the world" phenomena, emphatically not merely concepts of ours. He rejects concepts as the objects of epistemological theorizing on the ground that by bringing concepts into an epistemological investigation, "we only succeed in changing the subject: instead of talking about knowledge, we end up talking about our concept of knowledge" (2002: 9-10). For Kornblith, the methodology of consulting intuitions (within epistemology) is part of a scientifi c inquiry into the nature of knowledge, closely akin, to use his example, to what a rock collector does when gathering samples of some interesting kind of stone for the purpose of fi guring out what the samples have in common. Let us examine this approach.
Presumably, an inquiry into the composition of a natural kind is an inquiry into a this-world phenomenon. Even if natural kinds have the same essence or composition in every possible world in which they exist, the question for natural science is which of the conceivable natural kinds occupy our world. Does this feature of scientifi c inquiry into natural kinds mesh with the philosophical practice of consulting intuitions? No. A ubiquitous feature of philosophical practice is to consult intuitions about merely conceivable cases. Imaginary examples are treated with the same respect and importance as real examples. Cases from the actual world do not have superior evidential power as compared with hypothetical cases. How is this compatible with the notion that the target of philosophical inquiry is the composition of natural phenomena? If philosophers were really investigating what Kornblith specifi es, would they treat conceivable and actual examples on a par? Scientists do nothing of the sort. Th ey devote great time and labor into investigating actual-world objects; they construct expensive equipment to perform their investigations. If the job could be done as well by consulting intuitions about imaginary examples, why bother with all this expensive equipment and labor-intensive experiments? Evidently, unless philosophers are either grossly deluded or have a magical shortcut that has eluded scientists (neither of which is plausible), their philosophical inquiries must have a diff erent type of target or subject-matter.
In responding to criticisms of this sort, Kornblith (2005) indicates that although he regards epistemology as an empirical discipline, it nonetheless investigates necessary truths about knowledge. Just as it is a necessary truth that water is H 2 O, so there are various necessary truths about knowledge, and it is epistemology's job to discover these truths. Might this be why it is legitimate for epistemologists to adduce merely conceivable examples, involving other possible worlds? Kornblith doesn't say this, and it seems inadequate as a potential response. While it may be a necessary truth that water is H 2 O, scientists fi rst have to discover that what water is (in the actual world) is H 2 O, and Kornblith admits that this must be an empirical discovery. Intuitive reactions to merely imaginary cases are not part of such an empirical procedure. Similarly, we cannot scientifi cally discover what knowledge is in the actual world by consulting intuitions about imaginary cases. So why do philosophers engage in this activity?
When I raise this point (Goldman 2005) in discussing Kornblith's book, he concedes that his approach doesn't explain philosophers' preoccupation with imaginary examples. He adds: "Goldman may have underestimated the extent to which I believe that standard philosophical practice should be modifi ed " (2005: 428) . So Kornblith agrees that, so long as we are discussing existing philosophical practice, his kind of naturalism cannot do the job. But he holds that existing practice is somehow inadequate or objectionable. I shall return to these concerns of his at the end of this paper. For now I reiterate the point that as long as we are merely trying to describe or elucidate existing practice, the natural kinds approach (as Kornblith spells it out) cannot be right.
Concepts in the Fregean sense
We turn now to the third proposed construal, concepts in the Fregean sense of "concept", which we called "concepts 1 ". In this sense, concepts are abstract entities of some sort, graspable by multiple individuals. Th ese entities are thought of as capable of becoming objects of a faculty of intuition, rational intuition. Moreover, philosophers like Bealer (1998) want to say that rational intuitions are suffi ciently reliable to confer evidence on the appropriate classifi cation (or "application") propositions. Indeed, rational intuition is a faculty or source that is modally reliable (in Bealer's terminology). Two questions arise here: What distinguishes rational intuitions from other types of intuition, and is there good reason to think that rational intuitions -specifi cally, the sub-category of classifi cation intuitions -have the needed properties to qualify as an evidential source?
According to Bealer, rational intuitions are distinguishable from other (e.g., physical) intuitions in virtue of the fact that rational intuitions have a sort of modal content. "[W]hen we have a rational intuition -say, that if P then not not P -it presents itself as necessary; it does not seem to us that things could be otherwise; it must be that if P then not not P. " (1998: 207) Bealer goes on to say that application intuitions, i.e., intuitions to the eff ect that a certain concept does or does not apply to a certain case, are a species of rational intuitions. He is not sure how to analyze what it means for an intuition to present itself as necessary (and hence to be a rational intuition), but off ers the following tentative proposal: "necessarily, if x intuits that P, it seems to x that P and also that necessarily P" (1998: 207) .
Does this work? How are we to understand the initial operator "necessarily"? Is it metaphysical necessity? So understood, the claim can't be right. It implies that it is metaphysically impossible for there to be any creature for whom it seems that 18 + 35 = 53 but for whom it doesn't seem that necessarily, 18 + 35 = 53. But such a creature surely is possible. For starters, there could be a creature that understands arithmetic but doesn't understand modality. Second, there could be a creature that understands both arithmetic and modality but forms intuitions about modality more slowly than intuitions about arithmetic. At some moments, it seems to this creature that the foregoing arithmetic sum is correct but it doesn't yet seem to him that it is necessary. Th e same point applies to application intuitions. Presented with a Gettier example, it strikes a beginning philosophy student that this is not an instance of knowing, but it doesn't strike the student as necessarily true. I suspect this is the actual condition of many beginning philosophy students. Th ey have application intuitions without any accompanying modal intuitions.
A diff erent approach to the explication of rational intuitions is pursued by Ernest Sosa (1998) . In seeking to identify intuition in the philosophically relevant sense, Sosa places great weight on the content of an intuition being abstract. "To intuit is to believe an abstract proposition merely because one understands it and it is of a certain sort …" (1998: 263-264) . Should rational or intellectual intuitions be restricted to ones whose contents are abstract propositions? Sosa characterizes abstract propositions as ones that "abstract away from any mention of particulars " (1998: 258) . But this defi nition threatens to exclude our primary philosophical examples, viz., application intuitions. Th ese often concern particulars, both particular individuals and particular situations. Th us, Sosa's account threatens to rule out the very examples that most interest us.
If we can't unify rational intuitions in terms of their contents, perhaps they can be unifi ed in terms of their phenomenology. Perhaps a common phenomenology unites intuitions concerning logic, mathematics, and conceptual relationships. What might this common phenomenology be? A phenomenological feature they share is the feeling that they come from "I know not where". Th eir origins are introspectively opaque. Th is isn't helpful, however, to rationalists of the type under discussion. All intuitions have this opaqueness-of-origin phenomenology, including garden-variety intuitions like baseless hunches and conjectures, which are rightly disparaged as unreliable and lacking in evidential worth. Grouping application intuitions with this larger, "trashy" set of intuitions is likely to contaminate them, not demonstrate their evidential respectability.
Th is problem might be averted if we turn from phenomenology to psychological origins, including unconscious psychological origins. Hunches and baseless conjectures presumably lack a provenance comparable to that of mathematical, logical, or application intuitions. So unconscious origin looks like a promising basis for contrasting these families of intuitions. Th ere is a serious problem here, though. It is unlikely that there is a single psychological faculty responsible for all intellectual insight. Th e psychological pathways that lead to mathematical, logical, and application intuitions respectively are probably quite diff erent. Elementary arithmetic intuitions, for example, are apparently the product of a domain-specifi c faculty of numerical cognition, one that has been intensively studied in recent cognitive science (Dehaene 1997) . Th ere is no reason to expect logical intuitions to be products of the same faculty. Application intuitions are likely to have still diff erent psychological sources, to be explored below. So if the suggestion is that application intuitions should be grouped with mathematical and logical intuitions because of a uniform causal process or faculty of intellectual insight, this is psychologically untenable. It is initially plausible because they are not phenomenologically distinguishable. But if causal origin runs deeper than phenomenology -as it surely does -then the sameness-of-psychological-origin thesis is unsustainable. Moreover, diff erence of psychological origin is important, because it undercuts the notion that rational intuitions are homogeneous in their reliability. Arithmetic intuitions might be reliable -even modally reliable -without application intuitions being comparably reliable.
If the targets of application intuitions are Fregean concepts, does this inspire confi dence that such intuitions are highly reliable? Oddly, Bealer himself makes no claim to this eff ect; his central claim is vastly more cau-tious. Bealer acknowledges that concepts can be possessed either weakly or strongly. Weak possession is compatible with misunderstanding or incomplete understanding. Only strong possession, which Bealer calls "determinate" concept possession, carries with it a guarantee of truth-tracking intuitions. However, Bealer off ers no guarantee that either ordinary people or philosophers who possess a concept will possess it determinately. In the concluding section of his 1998 paper, Bealer summarizes his argument (in part) as follows: "With this informal characterization in view, intuitive considerations then led us to the possibility of determinate possession, the premise that it should be at least possible for most of the central concepts of philosophy to be possessed determinately" (1998: 231, emphasis in the original). If the determinate possession of philosophical concepts is merely possible, and by no means guaranteed or even probable, why should philosophers rely on ordinary people's intuitions as guides to a concept's contours? No evidence is provided that people, especially lay people, actually grasp selected philosophical concepts determinately. So Bealer's approach provides no solid underpinning for the philosophical practice of consulting ordinary people's application intuitions.
Finally, construing Fregean concepts as the targets of application intuitions doesn't safeguard against the possibility of diff erent people having diff erent application intuitions about the same concept and example. If there are many instances of such confl icts, these intuitions won't have even high contingent reliability, much less high modal reliability. Traditionally, philosophers haven't worried much about this prospect. But some of the intuition skeptics mentioned at the outset worry very much about it. Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2001) have done studies of people's intuitions, including intuitions about the applicability of the knowledge concept in Gettier-style cases. In contrast to the widespread view among epistemologists that Gettier-style cases prompt highly uniform intuitions, they found substantial divergences in intuition, surprisingly, along cultural lines. Undergraduate students at Rutgers University were used as subjects, and were divided into those with Western (i.e., European) ethnicities versus East Asian ethnicities. In one study involving a Gettier-style case, a large majority of Western subjects rendered the standard verdict that the protagonist in the example "only believes" the proposition, whereas a majority of East Asian subjects said the opposite, i.e., that the protagonist "knows" (2001: 443; see Figure  5 ). If cases like this are rampant (and that remains to be shown), it's a non-trivial challenge to the reliability of application intuitions under the Fregean concept construal.
Concepts in the personal psychological sense
Suppose that the target of philosophical analysis is concepts, but concepts in the psychological rather than the Fregean sense. In this sense, a concept is literally something in the head, for example, a mental representation of a category. If there is a language of thought, a concept might be a (semantically interpreted) word or phrase in the language of thought. What I mean by a personal psychological sense of concept is that the concept is fi xed by what's in its owner's head rather than what's in the heads of other members of the community.
3 It's an individual aff air rather than a social aff air. Th is does not prejudice the case for a separate sense of "concept" pertaining to a community (what I mean to denote by "concept 3 ").
A chief attraction of construing concepts 2 as the targets of philosophical analysis (though perhaps not the ultimate targets) is that it nicely handles challenges to the reliability of intuition arising from variability or confl icts of intuitions across persons. If the targets are construed as concepts in the personal psychological sense, then Bernard's intuition that F applies to x is evidence only for his personal concept of F, and Elke's intuition that F doesn't apply to x is evidence only for her personal concept of F. If Bernard intuits that a specifi ed example is an instance of knowledge and Elke intuits otherwise, the confl ict between their intuitions can be minimized, because each bears evidentially on their own personal concepts, which may diff er. his or her concept 2 , viz., whether the concept 2 does or doesn't apply to the chosen example.
It must be conceded that when a person thinks the thought, or has the intuition, "Th e Gettier disjunction case isn't an instance of knowledge", the content of the thought is not self-referential. It isn't naturally expressed as, "Th e Gettier disjunction case isn't an instance of my personal concept of knowledge". Nonetheless, epistemologists are at liberty to take the person's intuition, or thought, as evidence for a proposition concerning that person's individualized, psychological concept. Th is is what I propose to do.
But why is a person's intuition evidence for a personal psychological concept? I assume that any evidential relationship depends, at a minimum, on a relation of reliable indicatorship. But what makes such a relation hold in the case of application intuitions and concepts 2 ? Do we have reason for thinking that it holds? And do we avoid reasons for seriously doubting the existence of a reliable indicatorship relation?
Distinguish two approaches to the relation between concepts and evidencehood: constitutive and non-constitutive approaches. A constitutive approach can be illustrated by reference to phenomenalism (or other assorted versions of idealism). According to phenomenalism, what it is to be a physical object of a certain sort is that suitably situated subjects will experience perceptual appearances of an appropriate kind. Appearances of the appropriate kind are not only evidence for a physical object of the relevant sort being present, but the evidentiary relation is constitutively grounded. Th e evidentiary status of appearances is grounded in the very constitution of physical objects. Physical objects are precisely the sorts of things that give rise to appearances of the kind in question. According to realism, by contrast, to be a physical object has nothing essentially to do with perceptual experience. True, physical objects may cause perceptual experiences, but what they are (intrinsically) is wholly independent of perceptual experience. Th is view is compatible with perceptual experiences qualifying as evidence for the presence of appropriate physical objects, but here the evidential relation would not be constitutively grounded. Th ere are many possible theories of non-constitutive evidencehood; I won't try to survey such theories. What is important for the moment is simply the distinction between constitutive and non-constitutive groundings of evidential relations.
Although I don't support phenomenalism, I am inclined to support a parallel theory for the evidential power of application intuitions. I think that the evidential status of application intuitions is of the constitutively-grounded variety. It's part of the nature of concepts (in the personal psychological sense) that possessing a concept tends to give rise to beliefs and intuitions that accord with the contents of the concept. If the content of someone's concept F implies that F does (doesn't) apply to example x, then that person is disposed to intuit that F applies (doesn't apply) to x when the issue is raised in his mind. Notice, I don't say that possessing a particular concept of knowledge makes one disposed to believe a correct general account of that knowledge concept. Correct general accounts are devilishly diffi cult to achieve, and few people try. All I am saying is that possessing a concept makes one disposed to have pro-intuitions toward correct applications and con-intuitions toward incorrect applications -correct, that is, relative to the contents of the concept as it exists in the subject's head. However, our description of these dispositions must be further qualifi ed and constrained, to get matters right.
Th ere are several ways in which application intuitions can go wrong. First, the subject may be misinformed or insuffi ciently informed about example x. Her intuitive judgment can go awry because of an erroneous belief about some detail of the example. Second, although she isn't misinformed about the example, she might forget or lose track of some features of the example while mentally computing the applicability of F to it. Th ird, the subject might have a false theory about her concept of F, and this theory may intrude when forming an application intuition. It's important here to distinguish between a theory presupposed by a concept and a theory about the concept, i.e., a general account of the concept's content. Here I advert only to the latter. Any of these misadventures can produce an inaccurate intuition, i.e., inaccurate relative to the user's own personal concept. For these reasons, intuitions are not infallible evidence about that personal concept.
Th ese points go some distance toward explaining actual philosophical practice. First, philosophers are leery about trusting the intuitions of other philosophical analysts who have promoted general accounts of the analysandum, e.g., knowledge or justifi cation. Commitment to their own favored account can distort their intuitions, even with respect to their own (pre-theoretical) concept. Second, because erroneous beliefs about an example can breed incorrect intuitions, philosophers prefer stipulated examples to live examples for purposes of hypothesis testing. In a stipulated example, the crucial characteristics of the example are highlighted for the subject, to focus attention on what is relevant to the general account currently being tested.
Although errors in application intuitions are possible, a person's application intuitions vis-à-vis their own personal concepts are highly likely to be correct if the foregoing safeguards are in place. Th us, the reliability criterion for evidence-conferring power -one very natural criterion (or partial criterion) -is met under the concepts 2 construal of the targets of philosophical analysis.
Another virtue of the concepts 2 approach is the congenial naturalistic framework it provides for the respectability of application intuitions as evidence. Unlike Platonic forms, natural kinds, or Fregean concepts, there can be a clear causal relationship between personal concepts and application intuitions concerning those concepts. Although psychological details remain to be fi lled in, there is nothing inherently mysterious in there being a causal pathway from personal psychological concepts to application intuitions pertaining to those concepts. Personal psychological concepts can be expected to produce accurate intuitions concerning their applicability. So as long as the various threats of error of the kinds enumerated above aren't too serious, high reliability among application intuitions is unperplexing and unremarkable under the concepts 2 approach. Although naturalistically-minded philosophers are understandably suspicious and skeptical about intuitions and their evidential bona fi des, here we have a satisfying resolution to the challenge from naturalistic quarters, a resolution that copes straightforwardly with existing evidence of interpersonal variation in intuitions. Th us, I share with Kornblith the aim of obtaining an epistemology of philosophical method that sits comfortably within a naturalistic perspective. Whereas Kornblith's naturalism leads him to extra-psychological objects as the targets of philosophical theory and to very limited acceptance of intuitional methodology, my psychologistic brand of naturalism leads to personal psychological concepts as the initial targets of philosophical analysis and to a greater acceptance of standard intuitional methodology.
Shared and socially fi xed concepts
A predictable response to our proposal is that even if intuitions constitute evidence for personal psychological concepts, that's not a very interesting fact. Personal concepts can't be all -or even very much -of what philosophy is after. Fair enough. I am not saying that the analysis of personal concepts is the be-all and end-all of philosophy, even the analytical part of philosophy. But perhaps we can move from concepts 2 to concepts 3 , i.e., shared (psychological) concepts. Th is can be done if a substantial agreement is found across many individuals' concepts 2 . Such sharing cannot be assumed at the outset, however; it must be established. Philosophers often presume that if their own and their colleagues' intuitions point to a certain conclusion about a concept, that's all the evidence needed. If discerning judges agree in matters of concept application, then other judges would make the same assessment. Th e empirical work of Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) , however, raises doubts about this. And we all know from even casual philosophical discussion that philosophers don't always share one another's intuitions. Moreover, intuitive disagreement is probably underreported in the literature, because when philosophers publish their work they typically avoid examples they know have elicited confl icting intuitions among their colleagues. So the extent of disputed intuitions may be greater than philosophers offi cially acknowledge, and this may challenge the hope of identifying unique, socially shared concepts.
To safeguard some sort of supra-individual conception of concepts, there are other ways to proceed. One possibility is not to place the personal concepts of all individuals on a par, but to privilege some of them. How might this be done? Th ere are several possibilities, some appealing to metaphysics and some to language. An appeal to metaphysics might return us to the natural kinds approach. Concepts that correspond to natural kinds should be privileged, those that don't, shouldn't. Th e problem here is that it's doubtful that every target of philosophical analysis has a corresponding natural kind. Take knowledge again as an example. A popular view in contemporary epistemology (with which I have much sympathy) is that knowledge has an important context-sensitive dimension. Th e exact standard for knowledge varies from context to context. Since it seems unlikely that natural kinds have contextually variable dimensions, this renders it dubious that any natural kind corresponds to one of our ordinary concepts of knowledge.
A more promising approach is to recast the entire discussion in terms of language. Concepts are the meanings of (predicative) words or phrases (Jackson 1998: 33-34) . Th e correct public concept of knowledge is the meaning of "know". Many people who use the word "know" and its cognates may not have a full or accurate grasp of its meaning. Th eir intuitions should be ignored or marginalized when we try to fi x the extension and intension of the term. Only expert intuitions should be consulted. Th is is a natural line of development of Putnam's (1975) theme that meanings are determined by a division of linguistic labor in which experts play a central role.
4
I hesitate to go down this road for two reasons. First, the idea of a division of linguistic labor, in which deference to linguistic experts holds sway, makes most sense for technical terms that aren't mastered by ordinary users of the language. Clearly, it would be a mistake for philosophical theorists to rely on the classifi cation intuitions of users with inadequate mastery of the meanings of the words. However, concepts expressed by technical terms are not the chief concern of philosophical analysis. Philosophical analysis is mainly interested in common concepts, ones that underpin our folk metaphysics, our folk epistemology, our folk ethics, and so forth. I don't say this is all that philosophy is or should be concerned with. But when philosophers engage in analysis, folk concepts are what preoccupy them (Jackson, 1998) . In this terrain, there isn't any signifi cant expert/ novice divide. Th us, if there are still diff erences in personal concepts associated with a single word, the diff erences cannot be resolved by appeal to (semantic) experts.
Second, there is a general problem with any attempt to confi gure the conceptual analysis enterprise in purely linguistic terms. Many of our most important folk-ontological concepts, I submit, are prior to and below the level of natural language. For instance, our unity criteria for physical objects fi x the contours of single whole objects without recourse to predicates of natural language. Th ey are independent of particular linguistic sortals, as illustrated by our ability to visually pick out a unitary physical object without yet deciding what kind of object it is. ("It's a bird, it's a plane, no, it's Superman!") Indeed, deployment of such criteria is a prerequisite for children to acquire mastery of verbal sortals. Children must already pick out unifi ed physical objects in order to learn (at least with approximate accuracy) what adults refer to by such sortals as "rabbit", "cup", "tree", "toy", and so on (Bloom 2000) . Evidently, the concept of a whole physical object is an important one for folk metaphysics to analyze. Th us, it would be a mistake to equate the domain of conceptual analysis with the domain of linguistic analysis.
I conclude that there is no satisfactory way to promote a public or community-wide conception of concepts to the primary, or central, position in the project of conceptual analysis. From an epistemic standpoint, certainly, it is best to focus on the personal psychological conception of concepts as the basic starting point, and view the public conception of concepts as derivative from that one in the indicated fashion.
Are intuition-based beliefs justifi ed a priori?
Defenders of intuition-driven methodology hold that intuitions provide evidence, or warrant, for classifi cation propositions of interest to philosophers. What kind of warrant is this? Th e warrant in question is commonly held to be of the a priori variety. Intuition, after all, is a traditional hallmark of rationalism, an oft-mentioned source of a priori warrant. Is this something I am prepared to accept? Isn't my purpose, in this and related papers, to show how the evidence-conferring power of intuitions fi ts within a naturalistic perspective in epistemology? How can a priori warrant be reconciled with epistemological naturalism?
A fi rst reply is that, in my view, there is no incompatibility between naturalism and a priori warrant. True, many contemporary naturalists, following Quine, wholly reject the a priori. But I see no necessity for this position. My favored kind of epistemological naturalism holds that warrant, or justifi cation, arises from, or supervenes on, psychological processes that are causally responsible for belief (Goldman 1986 (Goldman , 1994 . Th e question, then, is whether there are kinds of psychological processes that merit the label "a priori" and are capable of conferring justifi cation. It seems plausible that there are such processes. Th e processes of mathematical and logical reasoning are salient candidates for such processes. Th ey are processes of pure ratiocination, which is the hallmark of the a priori. So I see no reason why epistemic naturalism cannot cheerfully countenance a priori warrant (Goldman 1999). 5 It is an additional question, however, whether arriving at classifi cation intuitions is a species of a priori process, and whether it gives rise to belief that is warranted a priori. Th is must be examined carefully. We must fi rst distinguish between fi rst-and third-person uses of application intuitions to draw conclusions about concepts. Start with the third-person perspective on application intuitions. 5. A main theme of naturalistic epistemology is that the project of epistemology is not a (purely) a priori project. But it doesn't follow from this that there is no a priori warrant at all.
Concept-analyzing philosophers seek the intuitions of others as well their own. Th ird-person conceptual investigation can readily be interpreted as a proto-scientifi c, quasi-experimental enterprise, the aim of which is to reveal the contents of category-representing states. Under this quasi-experimental construal, each act of soliciting and receiving an application judgment from a respondent may be considered a complex experimental procedure. Th e experimenter presents a subject with two verbal stimuli: a description of an example and an instruction to classify the example as either an instance or a non-instance of a specifi ed concept or predicate. Th e subject then makes a verbal response to these stimuli, which is taken to express an application intuition. Th is intuition is taken as a datum -analogous to a meter reading -for use in testing hypotheses about the content of the concept in the subject's head. From the point of view of the experimenter, the philosopher engaged in conceptual analysis directed at another person, the evidence is distinctly observational, and hence empirical. Th e warrant he acquires for any belief about the subject's concept is empirical warrant.
What about fi rst-person cases, where a philosopher consults his own intuitions? Th is is where a priori warrant looks most promising. In consulting one's own intuition, one makes no observation, at least no perceptual observation. Does this suffi ce to establish that any warrant based on the intuition is a priori warrant? No. Although the inference from non-observational warrant to a priori warrant is often made, I think it's a mistake. Some sources of warrant are neither perceptual nor a priori. One example is introspection; a second is memory. Introspection-based warrant about one's current mental states is not a priori warrant; and memory-based warrant about episodes in one's past is not a priori warrant. Since some sources of warrant are neither perceptual nor a priori, application intuition might be another such source.
Indeed, the process of generating classifi cation intuitions has more in common with memory retrieval than with purely intellectual thought or ratiocination, the core of the a priori. Th e generation of classifi cation intuitions involves the accessing of a cognitive structure that somehow encodes a representation of a category. Of the various sources mentioned above, this most resembles memory, which is the accessing of a cognitive structure that somehow encodes a representation of a past episode. Th us, although I am perfectly willing to allow that application intuitions confer warrant, I don't agree that the type of warrant they confer is a priori warrant.
Kornblith's critique of "détente"
In this fi nal section I briefl y respond to Hilary Kornblith's critique of my approach as presented in earlier papers. Kornblith (this volume) argues that the "détente" I off er between methodological naturalism and the method of appeals to intuition just won't work. Th ere are three strands to his argument. Th e fi rst concerns the question of whose concepts philosophers should analyze, and whether intuitions should be uncontaminated by theory (i.e., as Kornblith interprets it, whether the preferred concepts should be pre-theoretical). Th e second concerns the question of whether there is any point to the project of studying commonsense epistemic concepts as a precursor to the study of scientifi c epistemology. I have defended the value of studying commonsense concepts, as a fi rst stage of philosophizing. Kornblith disputes its importance. Th ird, Kornblith claims that standard philosophical analysis is committed to the thesis that concepts are mentally represented as necessary and suffi cient conditions, the so-called "classical" view of concepts. Th is view, Kornblith tells us, has been refuted by empirical psychology. So here is a sharp confl ict between empirical fi ndings and traditional philosophical methodology. How can I hope to achieve a détente between empirical psychology and traditional philosophical methodology when the two approaches confl ict so sharply?
On the fi rst point, Kornblith argues against the view that we should study just the intuitions and concepts of the folk. On the contrary, he urges, the theory-informed intuitions of thoughtful philosophers should count for more than the intuitions of the folk (who have given no systematic thought to a philosophical topic). Furthermore, in contrast to the methodological precept that urges suspicion of theory-contaminated intuitions, Kornblith says that theory-informedness is a good thing.
Th e problem with this argument is that two entirely diff erent relationships are being confl ated between theories and concepts (or theories and intuitions). A theory can be related to a concept either by being embedded in the concept or by being a theory of the concept. A theory of a concept says that the concept has such-and-such content. A theory embedded in a concept isn't about the concept at all; it's about some other set of phenomena. Th e intuitional methodology I preach only says that one should avoid intuitions that are infl uenced by a theory of the target concept. Infl uence by such a theory can prevent the target from issuing a "normal" response to an example, a response that expresses the real content of the concept.
Th e methodologist's desire to avoid theory-contaminated intuitions should not be confused with a desire to avoid intuitions concerning theoryembedded concepts. Th ere is nothing undesirable about theory-embedded concepts. I part company with Kornblith when he suggests that theoryembedded concepts are superior to theory-free concepts, because there are all sorts of theories. A concept that embeds a bad theory is of dubious worth. So I don't share Kornblith's preference for consulting philosophers' intuitions simply because their concepts embed theories more than folk concepts do. Th e crucial point, however, is the distinction between a methodological stricture against theory-contaminated intuitions and a possible stricture against theory-embedded concepts. I endorse only the former.
Kornblith's second criticism takes issue with my endorsing the study of folk epistemic concepts as a helpful precursor to the study of scientifi c epistemology. Th is endorsement was predicated on the idea that we must fi rst identify the features of folk epistemology in order to fi gure out how it might be transcended by scientifi c epistemology, while ensuring that the latter project is continuous with the former. Here is an illustration of what I had in mind. Examining folk epistemic concepts should reveal how truth (true belief ) is a primary basis of epistemic evaluation and epistemic achievement. Th is is indicated, for example, by the truth-condition on knowledge and the reliability desideratum associated with justifi edness. When moving from folk epistemology to scientifi c epistemology, we should retain the concern with truth-related properties of methods and practices. We should try to make them more reliable than our existing practices. If we never studied folk epistemic concepts, or studied them without proper understanding, this desideratum might elude us. It has indeed eluded postmodernists and (many) sociologists of science, who spurn the activity of conceptual analysis applied to concepts like knowledge or justifi cation. Th ey preach a kind of reformed or purifi ed epistemic regime that ignores truth altogether. Th is radical and unfortunate detour from traditional epistemological concerns could be avoided by not abandoning folk epistemic notions and not neglecting the important features they highlight, such as truth.
Kornblith's third criticism is that a serious respect for the fi ndings of cognitive science is incompatible with traditional conceptual analysis. I cannot advocate both, as I appear to do. Traditional analysis assumes that concepts are represented in terms of necessary and suffi cient conditions, whereas cognitive science tells us that concepts take quite a diff erent form from this classical one. Kornblith urges us to heed the teaching of cognitive science and abandon traditional conceptual analysis.
I deny that traditional analysis is committed to the thesis that concepts (in the psychological sense) are mentally represented by features that are individually necessary and jointly suffi cient. In fact, in two previous papers (Goldman 1992; Goldman and Pust 1998: 193-194 ) I have specifi cally recommended the exemplar-based approach that Kornblith also calls to our attention. Th e method of consulting intuitions about cases places no constraint on the psychological format of concept representations. Any hypothesis about concept representations that correctly predicts "observed" classifi cation intuitions is tenable and welcome. Intuition-driven methodology imposes no requirement that hypotheses must posit a classical format for concept representation. True, in formulating the content of a concept representation, philosophers have customarily adopted the format of necessary and suffi cient conditions, but I see nothing essential about that practice. For example, a recursive format could be adopted instead, using base clauses, recursive clauses, and a closure clause. In any case, exemplar based data-structures, paired with a set of similarity operations, might well yield classifi cation judgments that can be captured in terms of necessary and suffi cient conditions. (Th e conditions might involve a rather tedious set of disjunctions of conjunctions.) So the necessary-and-suffi cient-conditions format for expressing a concept's content is neutral with respect to the psychological "syntax" by means of which the concept is psychologically represented (and processed).
Finally, I disagree with Kornblith's claim that commitment to a necessary and suffi cient condition style of analysis biases philosophers toward unrealistically elegant or "pretty" analyses and toward dismissal of intuitions that shouldn't be dismissed. He criticizes philosophers, for example, for trying to explain away data that seem to show that knowledge can be false, by appeal to examples like "Most of what the experts know turns out not to be true". Admittedly, epistemologists commonly seek an alternative explanation of such intuitively acceptable utterances, an explanation that explains away the implication of false knowledge. But I see nothing wrong with this. It is plausible to explain such cases by saying that our speech often describes direct or indirect discourse, or propositions that are objects of propositional attitudes, while omitting overt quotation marks or attitudinal operators. In the present case, the utterance probably means something like this: "Most of what so-called experts credit themselves with knowing, or are credited by others with knowing, turns out to be false". Here's another case (due to Richard Feldman, 2003: 13) of a (true) sentence that apparently implies the existence of false knowledge. You are reading a mystery story in which all the clues, until the last chapter, point toward the butler. Only at the end do you learn that the accountant did it. After fi nishing the book you say, "I knew all along that the butler did it, but then it turned out that he didn't". Pursuing the explanatory scheme suggested above, one might paraphrase the sentence as follows: "All along I was prepared to say, 'I know that the butler did it', but then it turned out that he didn't". Th is is a good explanation of how the sentence is understood, and it doesn't imply the falsity of what was known. Th is simple explanation of an apparent departure from the rule that knowledge is true looks like a perfectly good maneuver. It off ers a general principle of language use that has considerable appeal and makes sense of the indicated utterances. It doesn't look implausibly ad hoc, and certainly not driven by an unreasonable commitment to necessary-and-suffi cient-conditions-style analyses.
So, to summarize this last section, Kornblith hasn't given us good reason to think that taking cognitive science seriously forces us to abandon the intuitional methodology of conceptual analysis, at least if this methodology is understood in the liberal way I have sketched.
